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This paper is an empirical study of the distribution of black prices among 120 Bavarian locations at two dates, the beginning of 
July, 1947 and the end of June, 1948. It shows huge differences in the liquidity of those goods either when measured with the 
coefficient of variation or the number of locations in which those goods were traded. The main finding is that liquidity of 
cigarette was very high either when measured by the coefficient of variation and or the number of counties that traded them. 
This made them special, even when compared with a pure fiat object such as the US dollar. Consistently with the insights of 
the modern theory of money, the high liquidity of cigarettes is indicative of its use as money.  
 
 
The use of cigarette to pay for illegal trades in Europe during the 1940’s is one of the most 
popular and often cited examples of the use of commodity money in modern times (Senn, 
1951, Klein, 1976). Yet our knowledge rests mostly on qualitative evidences that indicate its 
wide use in prisoners’ camp (Radford, 1945), in post World War II Europe
1 (Rosen, 1947) and 
especially in post war Germany (Friedman 1951, Kindleberger, 1984). This paper provides 
quantitative evidences on the cigarette money episode by using a sample of black market prices 
to compute the liquidity of the eight goods of the sample and to show that the liquidity of 
cigarettes was far higher than that of any other goods.   
Starting with Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and drawing on the work of nineteenth century 
economists such as Menger (1892), the recent monetary theory had shown that the bigger 
liquidity of money is linked to its role of medium of exchange in the exchange process rather 
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1 Although the following quote indicates that Germany was unique: “While the American cigarettes will fetch a 
high price in almost every country of Europe, it is only in Germany that it has been elevated to the dignity of a 
medium of exchange” in “The Cigarette standard” published by the Herald Tribune (2/28/1947)   2
than its issuance by the State. Burdett, Trejos and Wright (2001) applied this very general 
argument to the use of cigarettes as a medium of exchanges. Yet no empirical proof of this 
statement exists because any money that circulated in history was issued by a State or a 
Sovereign. Because cigarettes in post war Germany were not issued by any State and because it 
was illegal to use them in payments, this paper then constitutes the first empirical assessment of 
the statement that the liquidity of money comes from its sole role of medium of exchanges. To 
prove this point, I use an original dataset of black market prices for eight goods in 120 
Bavarian locations out of 143 in July 1947 and June 1948 to study various statistics of the 
liquidity and finds that the liquidity of cigarettes was highest.  
Two main criteria are used to measure liquidity: 1) a coverage ratio measuring the 
probability that a given good is sold on a given black market and 2) the price dispersion across 
locations. The first criteria indicated that cigarettes, like butter or coffee, benefited from a wide 
coverage while US dollars or the Military payment coupon– the two fiat objects– were quoted 
in only half of the counties. But the price dispersion was far lower for cigarettes than all the 
other goods, even when compared with fiat objects that were perfectly homogenous in quality. 
This shows that using cigarettes to trade on local black market reduced two types of risk: 1) the 
risk of not being able to sell the holding and 2) the risk to lose on the prices paid because of 
price dispersion. As monetary theory predicts, these two characteristics can be linked to the 
monetary use of cigarettes. The paper also tackles with two important issues. First it provides 
an explanation of why Germans switched from using a fiat currency (the Reichsmark) to an 
economy with barter and commodity money. Second, the interpretation of the level of price 
dispersion as an indicator of liquidity can hold only if black markets were integrated (i.e. 
people arbitraged among markets). The last section therefore tests whether the variance of the 
sample of prices can be explained by some type of markets’ segmentation. The results clearly 
allow rejecting this hypothesis.   3
While a few papers also studied the cigarette money episode, they mainly rested on 
qualitative evidences (Radford, 1945) or provided seldom mentions of the price range of 
cigarettes (Schmölders 1973, Botting, 1985, Bub, 2004). Rosen (1947) is the sole paper that 
also uses black prices to study the demand for cigarettes in 1945 Austria. Drawing on time 
series, he showed that the evolution of the cigarettes’ price on the Vienna’s black market was 
correlated with the price of the U.S. dollar before the monetary reform of December, 1945 but 
not after. He interpreted this switch as evidence of the change in the motive of the demand of 
cigarettes and concluded that this is explained by the cigarettes losing their monetary function 
with the stabilization. Although interesting, this analysis is somewhat questionable as no proof 
was provided that the dollar was a medium of exchanges in Austria and not just an asset. 
Therefore the correlation could only have meant that cigarettes were a kind of asset before the 
stabilization but not after. This would have be the case if people chose before December 1945 
to keep their wealth into real goods or foreign currencies rather than fiat money. To avoid this 
difficulty, this paper uses a different approach and measures the liquidity of goods on a spatial 
basis. It shows that the behaviour of the prices of dollar and cigarettes differed sharply from 
1945 Vienna (which is only 400 kilometres away).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 explained the emergence of a barter 
economy. Section 2 presents the theoretical literature and the dataset. Section 3 shows that the 
liquidity of cigarettes was far higher than the liquidity of any other goods. Section 4 rules out 
the hypothesis that local markets were segmented. The last section concludes.  
1.  The emergence of a barter economy in post war Germany  
The emergence of commodity moneys has roots in the institutional and economic 
background of the German economy. On the institutional side, the Allies continued the system 
introduced during the war to deal with shortages of civil goods and to prevent inflation. Two 
major shifts adversely affected the efficiency of this system and lead to the emergence of a   4
barter economy. First the fiat money lost his value not because of inflation but rather by lack of 
sold goods. Second the rationing system failed to provide an adequate standard of living.  
1.1.  Caloric value in the rationing system and the rise of black market transaction 
The distribution of food and clothes was primarily done through a rationing system in 
which consumers gained the right to purchase a predetermined quantity in the regular network 
of shops against a given amount of rationing tickets and a money payment in Reichsmarks. The 
quantities of the rationed goods sold were set each month by an authority that allocated the 
available production among the various groups of consumers. Therefore the caloric value 
distributed hinged primarily upon the level of production and the deliveries of the producers. 
Figure 1 shows that between August 1945 and June 1948 the caloric value of a normal 
consumer rarely exceeded 1,500 calories a day.
2 As a consequence, in June 1947 only 22% of 
the city dwellers of the US zone recognized in a poll that the food supply was adequate (while 
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Figure 1: Caloric value of the monthly ration of a normal consumer (US zone) 
Source: various issues of the statistical annex of the monthly report of the Military Governor of the US zone)  
This lack of calories distributed through the rationing system created roots for the 
development of illegal exchanges. Various types of black marketing flourished as early as 
during the summer of 1945. Indeed a note of the US army dated the 30
th of July 1945 reported 
                                                 
2 The other groups included to heavy workers, pregnant women and various categories for children and teenagers. 
A typical normal consumer was a white collar working in the service industry.  
3 See OMGUS report #363. ICD.    5
that farmers refused to deliver the food to the rationing system, even when the German officer 
was accompanied by US soldiers. It was further indicated that this entailed “a noticeable loss of 
food from the normal market channels” because of “the people from the city going to nearby 
farms and buying on the spot.”
4 According to a May 1946 poll of the US occupation authority, 
18% of the sample recognized travelling regularly to the countryside in order to complete their 
food ration.
 5 Illegal markets for foods also emerged in the central places of big cities and near 
the train station of each town.
 6  
The market share of illegal markets had been big for products such as foodstuffs, clothes 
or shoes. In November 1945, an official report of the US army gauged that the proportion of 
illegal exchanges of foodstuff amounted to 20 % of all trades
7 and six months later, it had grew 
up to 50 % for some goods.
 8 The experts of the US military government believed that between 
one-third and one-half of business transactions proceeded in the form of barter trade 
(Menderhauser, 1949, p. 655). Ostrander, the head of the Price Control Section of the US 
Economic division, gauged in May 1947 that "the amount of food lost to control distribution 
through such channels is substantial, perhaps 20%" and that "the black market activity have 
assumed increasing significance during the last year" (Herald Tribune, 05.21.1947). 
1.2.  The Reichsmark, price controls and inflation 
The money stock – currency and deposits – had surged hugely during the war, increasing 
from 56.4 billions in 1938 to about 300 billions in May 1945 (Hansmeyer and Caesar, 1976, p. 
418). In 1945, the money stock amounted to 230% of the 1944 GDP while the stock of 
                                                 
4 Report entitled « BM operations in the American occupied zone”(07/30/1945), OMGUS archives, file 1/177 3/8 
shelf mark BICO C+J 
5 Cf. Merritt (1970) "Public Opinion in occupied Germany, The OMGUS Survey", University of Illinois Press. 
6 See for example the various report of the Bavarian food ministry at the Bayerische Hauptstaatsarchiv (Munich). 
File MELF 1118. 
7 Monthly Report of the Military Governor of the US Army in Germany #5, december 1945, section ''Trade and 
Commerce'', available at the Institut für Zeitsgeschichte, Munich, Germany 
8 Cf. Monthly Report of the Military Governor #11   6
currency represented 40% of 1944 GDP. Various measures reduced M3 by about 127 billions 
and during spring 1947, it was then gauged to 173 billions, including 79 billions of currency.
 9   
To avoid the development of a hyperinflation, the Allies decided to continue to work with 
the system of price control set up by the Nazi regime in 1936 and reinforced during the war. 
Two main changes however occurred. First there was no central (German) authority 
responsible for managing the system but rather an Allied Control Authority (ACA) while the 
(German) regional price offices kept the responsibility to allow most of price increases
10. 
Second the Allied strictly monitored both the working of the local price offices and of the price 





















































































































































































Consumer price index (without housing prices and rents)  
Figure 2: The evolution of the Bavarian Consumer Price Index and of the monthly inflation rate of prices 
(source: Bayerische Statistisches Landesamt) 
On February 6, 1946, the ACA issued a statement that “prices are to be maintened a the 
level before occupation” and “price increases shall only be permitted as an exception”. Figure 2 
shows the evolution of the Bavarian consumer price index. The evolution of this index 
indicated that the price authorities had been more lax towards prices increases than was 
                                                 
9 This includes 73 billions of currency in 1945 (70.3 billions of notes, 1.6 billion of Reichsmarks in divisionary 
coins and 1.1 billions of Rentenmarks) and 12 billions of banknotes issued by the occupation authorities (Allied 
Reichsmarks) to which one must subtract 6 billions of banknotes destroyed (Samuelson, 1972, p. 171-2). Petrov 
(1966) disputed the figures released on Allied Reichsmarks issued and argued that the Soviet had inflated a lot the 
money stock to destabilize the economy of the Western part of Germany. I did not find any document in the 
archives that could have corroborated this opinion. Moreover the public budget was balanced as soon as in 1947.  
10 See Menderhauser, 1949, p. 647-8   7
recommended by the Allied.
 11  The reason was that exceptions included the possibility to 
increase prices if firms encountered losses. And actually a 9 years froze must have created a lot 
of distortions in relative prices. Under the first three years of the Allied rule, from May/June 
1945 to June 1948 the CPI increased by 27% while it had increased by only 20% between 1936 
and May 1945. The annual inflation rate of official prices can hardly be qualified as a 
hyperinflation as prices went up by 13%, 4% and 10% during the first years of occupation. 
12  
1.3.  To black trade, barter or commodity moneys were preferred to fiat money 
The low level of calories delivered through the rationing system distracted people from 
obeying the law and they went on foraging for food in the countryside (Diskant, 1989, p. 555). 
As noticed in the November 1946 Report of the US Military Governor: “Far more than 
elsewhere, black markets in Germany are sporadic and erratic, consisting almost wholly of 
many isolated transactions.”
 13 The black market purchases were paid using various goods. 
The renouncement to the use of fiat money shall not come as a surprise. The combination 
of the huge inflation of the money stock and tight controls of prices should have resulted in a 
very low value of the Reichsmark in trade. Although the rationing (official) system were still 
characterized by the use of the fiat money, even the US occupation authority recognized in an 
April 1947 report of the economic division that “The RM is not yet completely worthless but 
its value is greatly undermined. Only the fact that the RM retains a certain usefulness in 
connection with the ration coupon gives it some continuing value.”
 14 As a consequence 
Reichsmarks units traded at a discount on post-war black markets that was gauged at about 
hundred times the legal prices.
 15  
                                                 
11 The price offices could agreed on a variation of prices when the producer presented evidence that the official 
price did not cover the production cost. 
12 Computations were done from June of year X to June of year X+1.  
13 Monthly report #17, p. 44. See Bignon (2007) for an account of the various illegal market structure.  
14 OMGUS, Econ division, Trade and commerce branch, 04/23/1947. File 1/ 194-1/6, mark BICO US Cust. Gp 
15 Menderhauser, 1949.    8
Far from just trading their Reichsmarks at a (huge) discount on the black markets, people 
renounced using fiat money in illegal trades. Sellers and especially farmers insisted on being 
paid in kind. An April 1947 report of the economic division of the US army indicated “not only 
does the German farmer now have each larger reserves [of Reichsmarks] than the urban 
population, but at the same time ration coupons have less meaning for the farmer than for the 
city dweller, since the farmer produces his own food.”
16 And consequently US detachments 
reported that “Workers no longer have faith in currency, and whenever they can receive money 
in payment for their work, they prefer goods.”
17 The stock of currency held by commercial 
banks in the US zone therefore raised six fold between December 1944 and March 1948, from 
less than two billions to more than 12 billions (see figure 3, the estimate of the stock of 





















































Figure 3: Value of Reichsmarks notes held by banks in the US zone (Dec. 1944 - March 1948).  
Sources : Monthly reports of the military governor of the US zone of occupation, various issues. 
The return on using fiat money in payments was lower than the return on using goods, even 
if this implied paying high transaction costs for finding a double coincidence of wants. As a 
result of the Reichsmark losing its medium of exchanges function, the black market prices were 
also immune from any inflation, at least from spring 1946 onwards (Menderhauser, 1949, p. 
                                                 
16 Report dated 04/23/1947. OMGUS, Econ division, Trade and commerce branch APO 742, file 1/ 194-1/6 shelf 
mark BICO US Cust. Gp. 
17 Periodic report for week ending on the 4 th september of 1946 from Det. 245, Landshut and Det. 348, 
Stadtsteinach. See National Archives of Bavaria, OMGBY file 10/85 3/1.   9
654). At least until 1947, this intrigued the US authority which repeatedly reported it in the 
monthly reports of the military Governor. Figure 4 shows that after an initial surge during the 
first months of the occupation, there was no positive trend on the black market in Frankfurt.  
Most the US reports and the academic articles written by the economists who worked for 
one of the Western Allies in Germany then pointed that people used “various forms of direct 
barter” as substitutes “for normal methods of purchases and sales”.
 18 Most observers indicated 
that each good could have been used as means of payment provided a seller accepted it in 
payment of its holdings. Sauermann qualified the economic life as a “primitive barter economy 
[that] guaranteed nothing more than an animal life” (1950, p. 178). Menderhauser (1949) 
















































Figure 4: The evolution of black market prices in Frankfurt am Main August 1945-June 1948  
Sources: Aug. 1945-Sept. 1946: OMGUS archives file 1/194-1/6 BICO US cust gp; Sept 1947-Jun 1948:  Kropat 
Wolf-Arno, 1979, Hessen in der Stunde Null 1945/1947.  
Some among the academics as Friedman (1951, p. 204) noticed that cigarettes, chocolate, 
candy bars and alcohol were regular means of payment. This does not come as a surprise as the 
exchange pattern between agents exhibited many transaction costs. Trades were completed in a 
much disorganized fashion with mostly decentralized trades in pairs and some kind of random 
                                                 
18 p. 2 of the August-September 1947 issue of the Monthly Report of the Military Governor - US zone. According 
to Lutz (1949), people “acquired most of the commodities they wanted against commodities they had to offer”.    10
search.
 19 Indeed the typical trading pattern was the following: City dwellers (buyers) travelled 
to the countryside or any places specialized in the production of the desired good with some 
valuables, cigarettes or industrial items and searched for a farmer (seller) ready to make a 
deal.
20 Often it took a while to figure out a seller that agrees to trade some food against the 
particular holding of a seller. Most of the time the seller at the first door at which the buyer 
knocked in some villages did not find it valuable to trade but if the buyer was fortunate enough, 
he will have gleaned some advices on whom could have be ready to trade. Another strategy 
was to carry on goods that were more acceptable by farmers such as commodity moneys.  
2.  Literature and data  
2.1.  What makes money special? Money and the liquidity of the goods.  
That money should have a higher liquidity than any other goods is an idea that dated back 
at least to Carl Menger (1892) and his idea of comparing the saleableness of the commodities. 
The point that is most relevant to our analysis is that “when the relatively most saleable 
commodities have become ‘money’, the event has in first place the effect of substantially 
increasing their originally high saleableness” (p. 250). He further argued that this greater 
saleableness impacted the relative prices, i.e. that the relative prices of commodities in terms of 
the commodity used as money experienced smaller variations that the relative prices expressed 
in others commodities.
 21 He also noted that a precondition was “a sufficient supply of 
[precious metals] had been collected and introduced into commerce” (p. 254).  
Recently the search models of money revivified the Menger’s intuition that money is 
the most liquid good (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989, 1993). The notion of liquidity in those 
                                                 
19 see Bignon 2007 for a rationale. 
20 As mentioned in the Herald Tribune on February 28, 1947 in an article titled "The Cigarette Standard": "A lot of 
them (cigarettes) undoubtedly end up in the hands of farmers because cigarettes are a way of getting food". 
21 The exact quote is the following : “This development [of the use of precious metals as money] was materially 
helped forward by the ratio of exchange between the precious metals and the other commodities undergoing 
smaller fluctuations, more or less, than that existing between most other goods, - a stability which is due to the 
peculiar circumstances attending the production ,consumption, and exchange of the precious metals, and is thus 
connected with the so-called intrinsic grounds determining their exchange value” p. 254 
   11
models hinges particularly on the acceptability of the good in the population, i.e. on the 
proportion of agents in the economy that accepts it in payment. Building on this concept, they 
show that specialization in productive activities makes agents willing to trade their goods 
against an intermediary of exchange that become widely accepted by the whole population, i.e. 
the most liquid good. They further prove that good intrinsic properties do not constitute a 
necessary condition for a good to be used as money. Later models used alternative specification 
of the intrinsic property components and showed that, provided the intrinsic component is not 
to bad, this basic result holds (Renero, 1999, Cuadras Morato, 1997). This indicates that to a 
certain extent the notion of liquidity (understood as the acceptability of goods by a population) 
is a substitute to the intrinsic component part of the goods traded.  
The liquidity component specific to the good used as money in those models hinges on 
the fact that when agents came to use an intermediary of exchanges, they created an additional 
demand for the good used as a medium of exchange (Cuadras Morato and Wright, 1996). This 
additional demand added to the demand for consumption purposes to make it the most widely 
acceptable among agents and can even induce some of its consumers to renounce to its 
consumption. Drawing on the work of Burdett, Trejos and Wright (2001), Bignon (2004) 
extended the model to analyse how the use of such commodity money can be linked to the 
proportion of consumers of that good in the population and the utility to consuming it. The 
results shows that if a sufficiently high proportion of the population accepts one good as a 
consumption good, then non-smokers will have an incentive to use it as money to reduce the 
search cost. But for smokers to renounce to the consumption, the utility of the good has to be 
sufficiently low. If both conditions hold, then a commodity could become money, i.e. the 
whole population used it to pay for their purchase of other goods. 
The key element in those models is the explicit modelling of the reasons that explained 
the demand for a medium of exchange, i.e. for using a (indirect) trade strategy alternative to a   12
direct barter
22. In the Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1993) models, specialization in productive 
activity reduced the return of direct barter by making it less likely to succeed on the market 
place. This results hinges then on modelling some degree of absence of double coincidence of 
wants. Therefore agents become willing to substitute their holding against a medium of 
exchanges, i.e. a good that has a greater acceptability in the trade process. The literature shows 
that other frictions impeding direct barter can be incorporate in the decentralized search 
framework to account for the demand for money as a medium of exchange (see Shi 2006 for a 
survey). This included imperfect information on the quality of the goods produced (Williamson 
and Wright, 1994), inefficiency in the bargaining process (Engineer and Shi 2001, Berentsen 
and Rocheteau, 2002), or in a dated goods economy some friction that impede the use of 
alternative payment arrangements such as IOU when there is a limited commitment to repay 
the debt through direct barter (Kiyotaki and Moore, 2004).  
This highlighted that the equilibrium liquidity of the good(s) used as money must be 
greater than the liquidity of all the other goods. Following the literature review, two measures 
can be used to proxy the liquidity of the goods. First a measure of price dispersion to account 
for differences in the relative prices and second an indicator of the coverage of the selling of 
the good, of the easiness with which people could have sold/buy their commodity. 
2.2. The sample of black market prices 
This paper uses black market prices in 120 out of 143 Bavarian districts. These prices are 
available at the county (Landkreis) level for two dates, July 1
st, 1947 and June 30
th, 1948. All 
prices are denominated in Reichsmark in 1947 and in Deutsche Mark in 1948. The greatest 
distance between two districts is 488 kilometres while the smallest is 8.5. Prices were collected 
in September, 1948 by the Economics division of the U.S. occupation army of Bavaria 
                                                 
22 Another important feature of those models is to insist on the difficulty to use alternative payments scheme to 
monetary exchange. This includes gift giving economy (Kocherlakota, 1999), i.e. economy in which a record 
keeping device is set to keep track of the completion of trades, or repayment of credit arrangement through credit. 
We do not discuss this dimension in this paper since the very nature of black market trade makes those alternatives 
very costly.   13
(OMGB) that asked their correspondent to give the representative black market prices at the 
beginning and the end of the period covered by the survey (available at the Bavarian archives). 
The questionnaire and the answers are in English. The sources used by each local office could 
have been the soldiers (who were very active on those) or the (German) local price police 
which monitored those markets. Both knew very well the phenomena.  
 
Map 1: Post WW II Germany, the Länder and the occupied zones 
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The survey gave the prices of eight goods: butter, sugar, coffee, cigarettes, meat, flour, U.S. 
Dollar and Military Payment Coupon. The Military Payment Coupons (thereafter MPC) were 
labelled in dollar and their original usage was for soldiers to pay in military shops. All prices 
are for 1 kg except cigarettes (one pack), dollar and MPC.  
On these eight goods, three were produced locally: butter, flour and meat. A statistical 
survey of the Bavarian statistical office helps to have a better idea of the specialization of the 
agricultural specialization of Bavaria.
23 The main cultivation was wheat which represented 
52% o the cultivated surface in the sample of counties studied. The area devoted to sugar 
amounted to 13,705 acres and represented 0.78% of the agricultural surface. sugar was then 
mainly imported from outside Bavaria. This was of course also the case for MPC and US dollar 
that were supplied mostly through US soldier. The remaining goods were imported and for 
example coffee was typically a “colonial” ware.  
Two types of cigarettes were traded on the black markets, either those made with dark 
tobacco or those of the Virginia type. As a result it was easy for traders to recognize the quality 
of those cigarettes. Botting (1985) noticed moreover that intermediaries helped to deal on the 
black market with the quality and weight of the cigarettes traded. The German production 
consisted of dark tobacco that was grown in two regions close to Bavaria (Schwaben for 50% 
and Pfalz for 30%, cf. Ruland, 1968, p. 58-59). This production amounted to 30 thousands tons 
a year. It was used to distribute cigarettes to consumers as part of their ration.
24 On the black 
market, German cigarettes traded at a 20% discount on U.S. cigarettes.  
American cigarettes entered the German economy by smuggling with neighbouring 
countries or through diversion of the import of the US army to supply the messes. Illicit 
imports by traffickers came from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Belgium and the Netherlands or 
                                                 
23 The book was edited as part of a series of publication “Beitraege zur Statistik Bayern” and is entitled 
Bodennutzung und Ernteergebnisse 1946 und 1947 (number 143). 
24 The ration of cigarettes was forty a month (valued around two-third of the monthly wage of a secretary in 
Berlin, cf. Herald Tribune – May 21, 1947 edition).   15
through the Hamburger haven (see Hess, 1996). Those traffickers also took advantage of the 
legal import of cigarettes by the US army to divert part of the delivery. For example, the 
newspaper Frankfurter Rundshau indicated that 10% of the 210 million American cigarettes 
had stored in a Frankfurter warehouse in October 1947 had disappeared by April 1948.
25 
But the prominent suppliers of American cigarettes were the US soldiers. They bought 
cigarettes either directly at the messes or ordered them to US based firms through their family 
and friends. The US military government for Germany
26 gauged these imports during spring 
1947 by checking the content of some of the 200 000 packages sent to soldiers between March 
and June. According to the newspaper Rhein Neckar Zeitung, they found cigarettes in 95% of 
the checked parcels.
 27 Hess (1996) provided a lower estimate with " half of the 3 million 
packages which arrived every month by military mail from the US were cigarette shipments".  
3.  Cigarette money  in post WW II Germany 
Contrary to what we are accustomed to with modern monetary economy, the use of 
cigarettes as money did not rule out the use of barter or other commodity money. But many 
qualitative evidences of the particular role of cigarettes can be provided (3.1.) and the study of 
the liquidity of the sample of black market goods in Bavaria confirmed this (3.2 and 3.3).  
3.1.  Historical evidences emphasizing the unique role of cigarettes in payments 
The insistence of most US reports and some other works pointing that Germans bartered a 
lot on the black markets is at odds with many other evidences that insisted on the use of 
cigarette as money and on the emergence of commodity moneys to reduce the transaction cost 
associated with a barter economy. Clearly the kind of situation in which city dwellers travelled 
to the countryside and searched for a suitable trader was characterized by huge transaction 
costs. Although some countrymen undoubtedly gave information to buyers on potential sellers 
                                                 
25 cited in Frankfurter Rundschau April 21, l948 
26 Cited in the New York Herald Tribune, 05/17/1947.  
27 Cited in the newspaper "Rhein Neckar Zeitung" # 87 of the 29
th of July, 1947   16
and then reduced the search cost, using a commodity money was another strategy to reduce it. 
Hence although some farmers did help city dwellers to direct their search towards the agents 
with whom they could have a double coincidence of wants, Germans also carried on holdings 
to reduce the search cost just as the search models of money predicted. Moreover the unlawful 
nature of those trades made credit difficult (Thurnwald, 1948). 
Most of the evidence on the special character of cigarettes comes from newspapers articles 
or German post war scholars. Many authors noticed the peculiar role played by cigarettes in the 
illegal sector. To cite just a few references, Hess (1996) and Bub (2004) provide detailed 
studies of its use as money. They indicate that cigarettes had a universal acceptability in post 
WW II Germany: everybody accepted them in payment. Moreover the acceptability of 
cigarettes on illegal markets were far higher than the one of the Reichsmark as highlighted by 
the Herald Tribune in its issue of the 28
th of February, 1947, “Anything money will buy, and a 
good many things it won’t, can be had for cigarettes in Germany today”. And in December 
1945, the newspaper Stars and Stripes noticed their “exorbitant prices” and explained it by the 
fact that “cigarettes buy potatoes, meat and other necessities because in this fantastic city-
market [Reichs]marks are considered hardly worth more than the paper they’re printed on”
28. 
The evidence pointed to the monetary function of cigarettes as a medium of exchanges and 
unit of account. In an article published during May 1947, the Herald Tribune wrote that “all 
prices in this shadowy world of commerce are either based or quoted in terms of American 
cigarettes (…) when shopping around for items, a visitor to “Black market alley” [in 
Franckfurt] will find dealers constantly quoting prices in Stangen (cartons). “Eine Stange” for 
this; “Zwei Stangen” for that”. (05.17.1947). About two weeks later, it wrote that “cigarettes 
today are too expensive for the average German to smoke but they provide a portable, easily 
                                                 
28 In Stars and Stripes, 12/30/1945, “Big Business: New York Fifth Avenue is a Bargain Deal Compared to 
Berlin’s Lush Black Market”, by Jack Caldwell.    17
negotiable medium of exchange” (05.21.1947). And Botting (1985, p. 179) gauged that 
cigarette changed “hand a hundred times before reaching the end of the line, the smoker”.  
The following quote sums up the relative advantage of cigarettes over other goods:  
In Germany, cigarettes lubricate the trade. For instance, if a Berliner has a large radio that he 
has decided to sell, he cannot conveniently lug it out into the country in search of a farmer 
willing to give him butter for it. Instead, he trades it to a black marketer for cigarettes and 
takes the cigarettes to the farmer. This has had advantage that he can dispose of the cigarettes 
bit by bit instead of having to accept a whole radio’s worth of butter at one time. Meanwhile, 
the black marketeer takes the radio to an American officer who gives him more cigarettes. 
With these he can get another radio or butter or whatever he needs to carry on his trade. Then 
he can sit down and smoke his profit — or a part of it. 
Herald Tribune, The Cigarette Standard, February 28, 1947 
The use of cigarettes as money was so widespread that the US army promulgated on the 
26
th of May, 1947 a new regulation that prohibited the free import of cigarettes by U.S. 
soldiers.
 29 The ban applied to the “mailing or shipment of these commodities through army 
post offices, international mail or commercial channels” and the war department coupled its 
action with an appeal to the general public for co-operation “in a strong move to wipe out black 
market trading in American cigarettes and tobacco”
30. The newspaper Tagespiegel however 
indicated that the main consequence of this new regulation was not to inhibit the use of 
cigarettes as money but rather their prices (4 August 1947).
31 Nonetheless the interesting 
consequence for the researcher is that the preparation of this regulation led the US occupation 
authority to mention for the first time in the Monthly Report of the Military Governor the 
monetary character of cigarettes as it stated in February – March 1947 that “to an increasing 
degree the Reichsmark prices of good have become subsidiary or have even been eliminated 
entirely from transactions in favour of a variety of direct barter ratios between goods, 
especially between cigarettes and other goods”.
 32 
                                                 
29 Cf. Die Wirtschaftsspiegel, July 15, 1947, „Zigaretten, die Vermögen liquiedierten“  
30 The Herald Tribune, 05/21/1947, “German Food Crisis Is Laid To Black Market and Cigarette” by John Elliott  
31 The original quote is: "Die „Zigarettenwährung“ ist nicht abgeschafft, sie ist nur aufgewertet worden, und 
weitern die gestiegenen Zigarettenpreise haben alle anderen Schwarzmarktpreise mitgezogen“. Nicht allein der 
Kaffee auch die Butter ist teurer geworden, der Zuckern die Feuersteine, viele Dinge, die ihrer Herkunft nach nicht 
ausländischen Quellen entstammen, sich jedoch offensichtlich nach der Zigarettenlage orientieren“.  
32 OMGUS #21, February and March 1947, section Price control, p. 19. The Herald Tribune copied this sentence 
in its May 21, 1947 issue.    18
Finally as another evidence of the value of cigarettes and of the huge disequilibrium 
between the supply and the demand (estimated to 80,000 tons by the newspaper Die Welt), a 
new type of entrepreneur emerged. Some clever people established small factories of cigarettes 
and bought the raw material from the Kippensamler – literally the collectors of butt-ends – who 
collected them from waiters and maids at places where cigarettes were thrown in abundance 
such as cinema, entrance to messes, soldiers’ clubs (Botting, 1985, p. 179).
 33 
3.2. Comparing the liquidity of cigarettes to the other goods 
Two criteria are used to measure liquidity: 1) a coverage ratio measuring the probability 
that a given good is sold on those black markets and 2) the coefficient of variation of prices 
across locations. The first criteria indicated that cigarettes, like butter or coffee, benefited from 
a wide coverage while U.S. dollars and MPC – the two fiat objects– were quoted in only half of 
the counties. The coefficient of variation of relative prices measures the risk of using one good 
or another to pay for those trades. This measure is especially accurate when agents arbitraged 
between districts with goods rather than Reichsmarks.  
The notable feature is that this statistics is always lower when the relative prices are 
computed in cigarettes, even when compared with fiat objects of perfect homogenous quality.  
This means that using cigarettes to trade in another district made people suffering from a lower 
spatial variation of prices than when holding another good. This suggests that the best strategy 
when using indirect barter was to pay with cigarettes. 
















Mean of prices  281,94  585,12  142,35  104,54  71,46  30,16  167,32  242,23 
Max  500  1300  400  260  360  120 400 600 
Min 70  80  22,5  60  12  5  45  40 
Range  (=  max/min)  7,14 16,25  17,77  4,33  30  24 8,89 15 
# of observations  120  119  119  120  116  110  71  66 
Cover ratio
34  100 %  99,17 %  99,17 %  100 %  96,67 %  91,67 %  59,17 %  55 % 
 
                                                 
33 It was estimated that the waiters of the Café Wein in Berlin earned an average of  50 Reichsmarks or 5 $ per day 
for selling 75 to 100 butts to a “Kippensamler”.  Using the fact that Botting indicated that it took 7 butts to 
manufacture a new cigarette, the 100 butts collected for the Café Wein allow to make about 15 new cigarettes. 
34 Is equal to the ration of the number of observations by 120 the maximum number of counties of the sample.    19
















Mean of prices  11,66  24,96  4,57  4,68  5,08  1,43  9,91  13,99 
Max 32  50  10  7  12  6  15,5  30 
Min  2,5  5  1  2,5  1,75 0,3 4,5 7,5 
Range (= max/min)   12,8  10  10  2,8  6,85  20  3,44  4 
# of observations  116  115  76  117  103  96  78  72 
Cover ratio  96,67 %  95,83 %  63,33 %  97,50 %  85,83 %  80 %  65 %  60 % 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample of Bavarian black market prices 
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for every good. The first line gives the mean of 
prices. The huge variation displayed between 1947 and 1948 is explained by the monetary 
reform of June 20, 1948 which was characterized by an exchange of the Reichsmarks against 
Deutsche Marks at the ratio of 20 to 1. Apart from this drop in the mean of prices, the cheapest 
item in 1947 and in 1948 was flour while coffee was the most expansive.  
The cover ratio measures the number of counties in which there were a price quote for a 
good. It is a proxy to measure the liquidity as long as agents arbitraged among counties and 
mainly used barter (rather than fiat money). In that situation, they had to take into account the 
probability of selling their holding when arriving in a county. In 1947, butter, cigarettes, coffee 
and sugar were sold in (quite) all districts while dollar and MPC were sold only in 55 % and 59 
% of the districts. In 1948 as compared to 1947, the liquidity of sugar, meat and flour decreased 
by respectively 30 and 10 points while other goods remained quite stable.  































Graph 5: The coefficient of variation in 1947 and 1948   20
Price dispersion was very high for all goods, either for those produced locally or 
"imported". This is not surprising as long as one remember the trade pattern on illegal markets 
described in section 1. While various alternative measures of price dispersion have been 
applied in the literature, two are especially accurate, the coefficient of variation and the range. 
The range is computed as the ratio of the highest over the lowest price. As such, it is scale 
independent but is not independent of the size of the sample. On the contrary the coefficient of 
variation – defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean – has the advantage of being 
both scale independent and unaffected by changes in the number of observations.  
The range of prices is large for any good with a minimum value of 4 for cigarettes in 
1947 and for MPC and dollars in 1948 (table 1). But the highest price of butter in 1947 was 7 
times bigger than the lowest price and for sugar and coffee it was more than 16 times bigger. 
This is indicative of huge spatial difference but as those results could have been driven by some 
outliers, it is worth to turn to the analysis of the coefficient of variation (CV). The coefficient 
of variation is very high both in 1947 and 1948 (graph 5). The cigarettes’ pack had the lowest 
coefficient of variation both in 1947 and 1948 with respectively 21.5% and 14%. Apart from 
cigarettes, the coefficient of variation varied in 1947 around 30 % for butter, coffee, M.P.C. 
and US dollars and increased to 46% for sugar and more than 77 % for meat. Those figures 
changed sharply in 1948 except for meat characterized by a big drop at 39 % and flour that 
increased from 52 % in 1947 to about 70 % in 1948.  
Coefficient of variation 


















CV of cigarettes   0  0.56  0.59  0.67 0.78 0.68  0.40  0.85 
CV of butter   0.37  0  0.53  0.65 0.63 0.70  0.54  1.04 
CV of coffee   0.35  0.46  0  0.58 0.78 0.63  0.45  0.52 
CV of sugar   0.48  0.55 0.74 0  0.84  0.61  0.58 0.85 
CV of meat   0.7  0.8  0.68 1.56 0 0.74 0.82  0.92 
CV of flour   0.53  0.64 0.72  0.67  0.70  0 0.77 0.76 
CV of M.P.C.   0.35  0.51  0.54  0.95 0.71 0.68  0  0.25 
CV of dollar   0.37  0.56  0.51  0.83 0.62 0.65  0.29  0 
Table 2: The coefficient of variation (in line) of relative prices   21
As mentioned in the first section, most trades were done either through barter or cigarette 
money. Computing the coefficient of variation of relative prices is then a more accurate 
measure of price dispersion. Table 2 presents the coefficients of variation of these barter ratios. 
They were computed by dividing the price of each item in one district by the price of the 
benchmark good in the same district. Two remarks are in order. 
On one hand, the coefficient of variation for relative price gives a measure of the risk 
associated with the use of barter or cigarettes money. This measure is especially accurate if 
agents arbitraged between districts with goods rather than Reichsmark. The notable feature of 
table 2 is that the coefficients of variations are always lower when the relative prices are 
computed in cigarettes. For example the coefficient of variation of butter (line 3) shows that its 
prices were less dispersed when the benchmark good is cigarettes (0.37 or 37 %) while it 
increased to 0.53 for coffee and to 1.04 for dollars. Doing the same exercise for the other goods 
(lines) shows that the coefficients of variation are the lowest for cigarettes (column 1). This 
means that an agent who took cigarettes to trade in another county suffered from the lowest 
possible spatial variation of prices (provided the district was randomly chosen). This suggests 























Butter Coffee Sugar Meat Flour MPC USD
CV of the relative prices in cigarettes
CV of the nominal prices
 
Graph 6: Comparison of the coefficient of variation of the relative prices in cigarettes and nominal prices 
On the other hand, the coefficient of variation of the relative prices in cigarettes did not 
differed sharply from those computed with nominal prices (graph 6). This indicated that   22
cigarettes did not lower price dispersion as compared to Reichsmark. One possible explanation 
for this low variation is as follows: Agents usually pay their purchases with cigarettes and then 
it could be that most of the observed quotes that local price office were in cigarettes’ pack. But 
as the survey asked them to give the price quote in fiat money, at least some offices converted 
the relative price in cigarettes by using the exchange rate between Reichsmark and cigarettes.  
3.3.  The incentives to search and the one exception, cigarettes 
In this section, I use the insights of consumer search theory to check whether it can 
rationalize the patterns of price dispersion exhibited in the sample. The consumer search theory 
was first introduced by the seminal paper of Stigler (1961) that explained the dispersion of 
prices by relaxing the assumption that agents know precisely the locations where the cheapest 
prices are quoted. To arbitrage, agents must then search sequentially for the best price among 
the whole distribution of prices and the key assumption is that this search is costly because 
agents incur a positive cost of obtaining each additional price quote. The key result of these 
models lies in the fact that consumers stop searching before they obtained the cheapest prices. 
In a model with identical buyers and in which sellers posted prices, Diamond (1971) showed 
that the price set by sellers is the monopoly prices. However, as long as consumers are 
heterogeneous, the equilibrium price distribution is non degenerate and typically there is some 
price dispersion in equilibrium (Baye et al., 2006 for a survey).  
Given the description of illegal exchanges in post World War II Germany, it seems natural 
to use this theory to investigate the properties of our sample. One of the most prominent results 
of this theory is that there exist a link between the price dispersion and the value of the good. 
This results from the fact that consumer will have an incentive to search longer for the lowest 
price when the item is more costly to purchase. Following Stigler (1961), there must then exist 
in equilibrium a negative relationship between the (mean) price of one good and the observed 
coefficient of variation. Using historical data on the prices of 4 goods in 1901 in more than   23
hundred cities, Eckard (2004) also exhibited this inverse relationship between price dispersion 
and the (mean) price of the product (p. 105). Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser (1979) observe a 
similar pattern in a cross-section of consumer products sold in Boston in the 1970’s and find a 
significant relationship between standard deviation of prices and the mean price. 
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Graph 8: Coefficient of variation and the mean of 1948 black prices 
Graph 7 and 8 plot the relationship between the mean prices of each of the 8 goods and 
their coefficients of variation in 1947 and 1948. They indicated an inverse relationship with the 
cheapest items (flour and meat) having the greater dispersion while the most expensive (butter 
and coffee) have a lower dispersion. They also show that cigarettes were an outlier as they were 
the third cheapest items but had the lowest coefficient of variation.  To check the robustness of 
Dispersion of black prices and 
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Graph 7: Coefficient of variation and the mean of 1947 black prices
Dispersion of black prices and 
the incentive to search in 1948
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this result, I plot the same graph using a truncated sample (right plots). It was constructed by 
selecting only counties in which all goods were sold. They show no significant changes. 
As expected, graph 7 and 8 exhibited a negative relationship between the incentive to 
search for the lowest prices and the price of the good. But cigarettes were an outlier as their 
(observed) coefficient of variation is lower than what their market value would have implied. 
This is especially striking since part of the coefficient of variation must have been driven by 
heterogeneity in quality. Despite this potential problem in the measure of the cigarettes prices, 
their coefficient of variation is still lower than the one of perfect homogenous goods such as the 
Military Payment Coupon or the U.S. dollar. 
4.  Side issues: Ruling out the case of segmented black markets.  
 The level of price dispersion indicated that the law of one price (LOP) did hardly hold on 
those markets. Besides consumer search incentives, two other candidate explanations could 
have account for high coefficient of variation. First it could have been that the LOP hold in 
each (separate) region but that interregional differences explained the level of price dispersion. 
The first subsection tests for that possibility. The second explanation relies on a segmentation 
of local markets with prices reflecting the local supply and demand. To rule out the possibility, 
the last subsection correlated the prices with the characteristics of each district.  
4.1.  The case of regional market segmentation 
In this subsection, I examine the spatial dimension of the sample to explore whether the 
level of price dispersion computed with the coefficient of variation can be explained by some 
regional clustering of the prices. One such possibility could have been that some regions were 
more expansive than others in say butter. Provided that the differences in prices among 
Bavarian region were big enough, this could have explained the level of price dispersion.  
This section explores the pattern of the spatial distribution of the sample of prices. To get a 
first insight of this pattern, map 2 provided the spatial distribution of the price of butter (Other   25
maps are in appendix 4 and 5). Inspection of these maps seems to indicate few spatial 
clustering of prices, with many adjacent districts characterized by huge discrepancy in prices.  
To systematize the exploration of spatial clustering of prices, this section computes a 
measure of spatial autocorrelation. Measures of spatial autocorrelation are especially interesting 
to investigate whether prices in one district was similar to the prices of its adjacent (neighbour) 
districts. Among the most widely used measures are Moran’s I statistics (Moran, 1950) that 
provide evidence on the whole sample and local measures of spatial autocorrelation which give 
a spatial association coefficient for a particular locality i (Anselin, 1995). 
35 
Map 2: Price distribution of butter in Bavaria on July 1, 1947 
 
                                                 
35 See for example Shiue and Keller (2004) and Keller and Shiue (2007)   26
Moran’s statistics measures the covariance of prices in connecting districts relative to the 
variance of the price across districts. Moran’s I will be different from zero if prices in 
connected districts are relatively similar. More precisely there will be positive spatial 
correlation (with a value of I close to one) if prices are similar among neighbouring districts 
while a negative spatial correlation will mean dissimilar prices. Table 3 gives the value of the 
Moran’s I statistics for each good either in nominal prices or in relative prices in cigarettes. It 
shows that no good was spatially correlated with value ranging from – 0.1 to 0.1. 
Moran’s I 
statistic  Butter Coffee  Sugar Cigarette Meat Flour  MPC USD 
For nominal 
prices in 1947   -0,0926  -0,0227  0,1156  0,0311  0,0255  0,0615 0,0635 0,0036
For RP in 
cigarettes in 1947   0.0184 0.0906  0.1284  -  0.0166 0.0855  /  / 
For nominal 
prices in 1948  -  0.0305 0.0437  -0.0952  0.0871  0.0794  0.1009 0.1184 0.1557
For RP in 
cigarettes in 1948   0.1028  0.0907  -0.0582  /  0.206  0.0764 0.1591 0.1723
Table 3: Moran's I statistic for nominal and relative prices in 1947 and 1948 
The absence of spatial correlation is striking and need some qualification. A statistical test 
was then run to decide whether these spatial patterns deviate significantly from a random 
pattern. Table 4 in the appendix indicates that quite all of the goods of the sample exhibit no 
spatial autocorrelation at the significance level of 5 % except in 1948 for meat, dollars and 
M.P.C. for which there is a positive association, i.e. expansive counties tend to be located near 
other expansive counties. 
Figure 7 gives a graphical representation of Moran’s I  for two examples, the density of 
dairy cows and the price of butter in 1947. The former is spatially correlated while the latter is 
not. The I statistics is equal to the slope of the regression line of the scatter plot and is indicated 
on the top of the graph. The horizontal axis represents the actual value of the variable while the  
vertical axis plots this value weighted by the value of its neighbours (see the appendix for the 
weighting method). As a result, the four quadrants in the graph provide a classification of four 
types of spatial autocorrelation: high-high (upper right), low-low (lower left), for positive   27
spatial autocorrelation; high-low (lower right) and low-high (upper left), for negative spatial 
autocorrelation. The variables are standardized so that the units correspond to standard 
deviations. The inspection of the graph shows that districts with a small density of dairy cows 
tends to have neighbours with a small density of dairy cows (and vice versa) while the graph 
for the prices of butter indicated that no such relation exists.  
 
Graph 7: Moran's scatter plots of the density of dairy cows and the 1947 prices of butter 
This investigation of the pattern of the price dispersion on Bavarian black market indicates 
no spatial autocorrelation.
 36 This shows that there were no regions in which the prices of a 
good tend to be higher than those of another region. The heterogeneity in prices was then not 
ordered according to a spatial pattern. One possible explanation is that markets were segmented 
and so that prices differed only according to the local supply or demand. The next subsection 
tests for this possibility.  
4.2.  Perfect segmentation of markets? 
As noticed above, the dispersion of prices as measured by the coefficient of variation is big 
for each good of the sample. Moreover, Moran’s I statistics and the maps of appendix 3 
indicate that the prices varied importantly even between contiguous markets. One explanation 
of such a pattern is that markets were segmented. This section explain the distribution of black 
                                                 
36 Maps in appendix 3 and 4 show the geography of the prices of butter, meat, dollar and sugar. Inspection of 
these maps indicated that the prices differences do not seem to be spatially positively correlated, as two contiguous 
districts are often characterized by a huge difference in the expensiveness of goods.   28
market prices according to the districts’ characteristics in order to check whether each district’ 
price was correlated with proxies of the local demand and supply for that good.  
The following example explains the intuition. If markets were integrated, the demand on a 
local black market could have been composed of two elements, the demand expressed by the 
local agents and the demand coming from agents that travelled to the district: 
Ddistrict = Dlocal + Dtravellers  
On the contrary, if agents did not choose to arbitrage, then Ddistrict must be equal to Dlocal. 
Also, on the supply side, the supply in a given district could come either from local or 
travelling producers. If producers did not choose to arbitrage, then the supply on a local black 
market is also equal to the supply of local producers. In the case of segmented markets, pij(Dj) 
= pij(Sj) – where i is an indicator of the good traded and j indicates the district – prices must be 
positively correlated with the local demand and negatively with the local supply.  
As neither the quantities sold on each local black market nor each district’s production is 
known, these variables are proxy using indicators of production capacity of the area 
considered. If markets were segmented, I expect the local supply to be negatively correlated 
with the price of butter. The demand side is approximated by two sets of indicators: population 
density as an indicator of urbanization and the mean industrial wages as indicator on the 
structure of the potential black market demand. The intuition for this is the following. People 
working in industry had to exchange on the black market in order to get the goods they need. 
Hence, if black markets were segmented, the more urbanized a district was, the higher the 
black market price must have been. We also expect that market segmentation would have 
entailed a positive correlation between the mean industrial wage of the district and prices.  
The data needed to construct these variables were collected in the 1947 statistical book 
edited by the Bavarian Statistical Office
37. It gives the surface of each district, the population, 
                                                 
37 In Bavaria, there are two kinds of administrative districts: Landkreise and Stadtkreise (also named "free cities"). 
When a Stadtkreise was included into the border of a Landkreis, I merged the two numbers.   29
the mean industrial wage of the district, the livestock, the agricultural surface and the working 
population. The following type of OLS regression tests for the market integration:  
Pij (1947) = α + β * supply +χ * Demand +  ui 
As for butter, this equation explains the prices of butter in 1947 by a proxy of the local 
production capacity of butter (the density of dairy cows in 1947) together with a proxy of the 
intensity of the demand for this good (the mean of industrial wages in the county and the 
population density). For sugar and flour, the proxy for the supply side variable is the 
percentage of the cultivated area devoted to sugar and wheat. As for meat, I approximate the 
local production by the density of pigs in the county. If markets were segmented, we expect the 
sign of supply side variables to be negative and those of the demand side positive. Results are 
reported in tables 6 and 7. They indicated few relationships between the local variables and the 
prices and when one is significant, the adjusted R square is close to 0.  
Nominal prices, July 1947  Butter Coffee  Sugar  Cigarettes Meat  Flour MPC  Dollar 
Population density  -0,072  0,136  0,0294  -0,013 -0,0011 0,0145 -0,026  -0,114 
Mean wage  0,418  -1,105  0,093  0,189** -0,106  -0,0187  0,366  1,416 
Supply side variable  0,295     -0,012     0,431  -69,82*       
Constant 224,1  719,04  124,64  79,46 76,32  39,71 50,91  -47,69 
Jarque  Berra  test  no yes yes yes  yes  yes  yes yes 
Adjusted R²   0,00%  0,00%  0,00%  1,90% 0,00%  7,16% 1,60%  9,15% 
# of observations  116  116  116  116  116  110  71  66 
Table 4: Regression results
38 for nominal prices in 1947 
 
Nominal prices, June 1948  Butter Coffee Sugar  Cigarettes Meat  Flour 
Population density  0,0004  0,005  -0,0017 -0,00016  0,0012  0,0002 
Mean wage  0,0331  -0,041  0,022**  0,007***  0,042*** -0,00046 
Supply side variable  0,064   0,0001  0,007  0,722 
Constant  0,768 29,15 -0,046 3,53 2,38  1,05 
Jarque  Berra  test  yes yes yes yes  no  yes 
Adjusted R²  0 %  0 %  0,47%  1,20%  0,90%  0 % 
# of observations  116  115  76  116  103  96 
Table 5: Regression results for nominal prices in 1948 
Tables in appendix 1 show that using relative prices in cigarettes as the left-hand side 
variable did not change the results. It then seems that there were no relation between the local 
                                                 
38 *: significant at 1%; ** : significant at 5 %; *** :  significant at 10 %   30
demand or supply and the level of prices. One explanation was that prices were not spatial 
autocorrelated while the proxy of demand and supply were (see table 1 in appendix 1).  
5. Conclusion 
The German economy experienced a huge change in means of payments with the end of the 
World War II. The Reichsmark was replaced as the money of the black markets by a 
combination of barter and commodity money such as cigarettes. This paper uses a new dataset 
of black market prices to provide evidences that the liquidity of cigarettes was far higher than 
the liquidity of any other good of the sample. To my knowledge this is the first empirical proof 
of the old intuition of money being the commodity with the greatest liquidity. The result hinges 
on the computation of various measures of liquidity such as probability to sell a good in a given 
district or a measure of price dispersion across districts. To check whether price dispersion was 
indeed a measure of liquidity, I also show that local black markets were not segmented, i.e. that 
despite huge spatial variation of prices, they must be consider as a network of interconnected 
markets. Because all districts quoted cigarettes and because the coefficient of variation of black 
prices was lower for cigarettes, this indicated that traders were strictly better-off when paying 
their purchases with cigarettes than with another commodity as they thereby limit the risk of 
losing because of price dispersion. 
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Appendix 1 
Relative prices in 1947.  
Table 6 indicates the relative prices of each good in the sample in terms of the other goods. It was computed by 
dividing the average of the ratio of the market price for good j in market i by the market price of benchmark good 
in market i. We interpret the result as follows: the figures in table 6 are the expected quantity of good that a 
consumer had to carry to barter it against 1 kg of good i (in line). This interpretation assumes implicitly that this 
type of action did not change the observation.  
This exercise shows that with one kilogram of butter a buyer could have purchase about half a kilo of coffee, two 
and a half kg of sugar or about 12 kg of flour. Conversely with one kg of flour an agent would have bought only 
120 grams of butter, 60 grams of coffee and 30% of a cigarettes’ pack. Clearly the prices of flour at that date were 
so cheap that people really have to carry a huge quantity of it to buy the other goods on the market. On the other 
side using cigarettes, butter or coffee to pay for purchases needed to carry on fewer amounts of goods and so make 
it easier to arbitrage between the various markets.  
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Relative prices (RP)  in 




in meat  in flour  in M.P.C. in dollar 
RP of butter (1 kg)  1,00  0,53 2,41  2,79  5,67  11,80  1,90 1,45 
RP of coffee (1 kg)  2,27  1,00 4,84  5,78  12,05 23,75  3,85 2,60 
RP of sugar (1 kg)  0,55  0,27 1,00  1,40  2,84  5,55 0,96 0,67 
RP of cigarettes (1 
pack)  0,43  0,21 0,93  1,00  2,27  4,45 0,69 0,52 
RP of meat (1 kg)  0,27  0,13 0,63  0,69  1,00  2,64 0,49 0,32 
RP of flour (1 kg)  0,12  0,06 0,24  0,30  0,58  1,00 0,22 0,15 
RP of M.P.C.   0,66  0,32 1,50  1,65  3,31  6,65 1,00 0,71 
RP of dollar   0,98  0,47 2,19  2,36  5,03  9,52 1,50 1,00 
Table 6: Matrix of the quantity of goods that could be bought by a given good (lines) in average on 
Bavarian black markets in 1947.  
 
Comparison of the level of price dispersion across periods and countries.  
The level of both the coefficient of variation and the range constitutes a clear indication that the law of one price 
did not hold on the spatial dimension both in 1947 and 1948. Moreover the comparison of the coefficients of 
variation (CV) of the goods of our sample with those found in the literature
39 (see table 3 in the appendix) shows 
that they were higher on black markets than on other markets. The coefficient of variation of sugar was for 
example 6.4% in US individual stores in 1901 while it was 48 % in our sample. Those of other durable goods such 
as grain or tea also exhibited a dispersion of about 10 % in the literature but it was three times higher for coffee in 
our sample.  A perishable product such as flowers had a coefficient of variation of 36.3 % in 2000 in US 
individual stores but the one of meat is two times higher in our sample (70 %) while butter has a comparable 
measure of price dispersion. The dispersion of the prices of potatoes varied from 8.34 % to 14.94% while the 
coefficient of variation of flour was greater than 50 %. Although it could be that differences in quality can 
explained a big coefficient of variation, the number that characterized the dispersion of the prices of coffee, flour, 
MPC, dollars are still higher than those documented in other studies. 
 
Good year  Mean 
prices 
Coefficient of 
variation  Data source  # of 
observations  reference 
Granulated sugar 
(USA)  1901  46 USD  6.4%  Individual stores  263  Eckard (2004: 103) 
Farm salt (USA)  1901  0.61 USD  26.2%  Individual stores  141  Eckard (2004:103) 
Grain (Europe)  1742-85  -  10.88%  Market price   15  Shiue & Keller, (2004) 
Rice  1742-95  -   19.8 % - 23.8 %  Market price  121  Keller & Shiue (2007) 
Potatoes   1976  0.29 USD  14.94%  Individual stores  9  Scholten & Smith (2002) 
Potatoes   2000  0.36 USD  8.34%  Individual stores  4  Scholten & Smith (2002) 
Tea  2000  2.38 USD  11.1%  Individual stores  9  Scholten & Smith (2002) 
Flowers  2000  42.65 USD  36.30  Individual stores  12  Scholten & Smith (2002) 
Table 7: Coefficient of variation in other empirical studies 
 
Computing Moran’s I statistics  
The computation of the Moran’s statistic needs to define a matrix of the interrelation between districts. This 
weight matrix {wij} in which wij = 1 if the ith and the jth district are spatially connected and wij = 0 otherwise. 
Spatial connectedness is here defined at the first order of contiguity relationships. This implies that wij is set to one 
when two districts are neighbours and zero when they are not.
 40 For a given year and good, the Moran’s I statistic 
or spatial autocorrelation coefficient is given by: 
 
                                                 
39 Most of the literature computes only the standard deviation of the prices of their sample. As argued, this 
measure is sensitive to the level of prices. Those papers were then not included in our survey as they cannot be 
compared with our indicator of price dispersion.  
40 All spatial statistics have been computed using Geoda (https://www.geoda.uiuc.edu/).   35
where i and j are two distinct districts, n is the number of districts, xi is the price of the good in district i and   is 
the mean of prices.Under the null hypothesis that the xi are identically and independently distributed normal 
variables, the expected value of the Moran’s statistic is E[I] = (N-1)
-1. Table 3 reports the results of Moran’s I.  
To test whether the spatial distribution of prices was random or ordered, I run a statisticial test whose logic is 
the following. If the number of regions is large the sampling distribution of I under the null hypothesis of no 
spatial pattern approaches the Normal distribution, then the mean and the variance of I can be used to create the 
statistic Z = (I-E[I])/￿￿￿￿￿whose value can be compared with the critical value of the Normal table. At a 
significance level of 5%, a value of Z greater than 1.96 or – 1.96 will indicate that the spatial pattern is 
characterized by spatial autocorrelation.  
Z(I)  Butter   Coffee  Sugar 
Cigarette
s Meat  Flour 
M.P.C
.   U.S.D.
For nominal prices in 1947  -1.46  -0.46  1.55  0.34  0.25  0.81  0.70  -0.17 
For RP in cigarettes in 1947  0.14  1.24  1.63  /  0.10  1.16     
For nominal prices in 1948  0.31  0.50  -1.56  1.14  1.01  1.33  1.53  2.00 
For RP in cigarettes in 1948  1.36  1.21  -1.04  /  3.03  0.98  2.08  2.33 
Table 8: Z statistic of spatial autocorrelation 
The four quadrants in the graph provide a classification of four types of spatial autocorrelation: high-
high (upper right), low-low (lower left), for positive spatial autocorrelation; high-low (lower right) and 
low-high (upper left), for negative spatial autocorrelation. The slope of the regression line is Moran’s I, 
listed at the top right of the graph (in blue). 
 

























Results of OLS regression for relative prices in cigarettes 
 
Relative prices, July 1947  Butter Coffee  Sugar  Meat  Flour 
Population density  -0,0007  0,0016 0,0005 1,1  E-5  0,0002 
Mean wage  0,0012  -0,023*  -0,0018  -0,0021  -0,0008
Supply side variable  0,0103     -0,00023  0,0032  -0,754*
Constant 2,481      1,602  0,902  0,485 
Jarque Berra test  no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Adjusted R²   0%  4,30%  0%  0%  9,62% 
# of observations  116  116  116  116  96 
 
Relative prices, July 1948  Butter Coffee Sugar  Meat  Flour 
Population density  0,0003  0,0009 -0,0042 0,002 3,32  E-5 
Mean wage  0,0094***  -0,011 4,79 E-5 0,0017  -9.147 E-5 
Supply side variable  0,0023     0,0049  0,0102*** 0,136 
Constant 1,01  6,57  -0,042  0,484  0,232 
Jarque Berra test  yes  yes  yes  no  yes 
Adjusted R²   1,46 %  0 %  0,89 %  1,46 %  0 % 
# of observations  116  115  76  103  96 
          
   density of dairy 
cow  Density of pigs  Density of 
population 
Mean industrial 
wage  Share of wheat  Share of sugar 
Moran’s  I  statistic  0,4296 0,5515 0,1267 0,1927 0,5259 0,4099 
E(I)  =  1/(n-1)  0,0087 0,0087 0,0087 0,0087 0,0087 0,0087 
Standard  deviation  0,0718 0,0671 0,0584  0,065  0,0698 0,0618 
Z(I)  5,862 8,089 2,021 2,831 7,410 6,492 
Table 9: Moran’s I statistics for right  hand-side variables 
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Appendix 3: Spatial distribution of the prices in 1947  
 
Map of the price of butter in cigarette’s pack  Map of the price of coffee in cigarette’s pack 
 
Map of the price of flour in cigarette’s pack  Map of the price of meat in cigarette’s pack 
 
Map of the price of sugar in cigarette’s pack     38
Appendix 4: Spatial distribution of the prices in 1948 
 
Map of the price of butter in cigarette’s pack    Map of the price of coffee in cigarette’s pack 
 
 
Map of the price of flour in cigarette’s pack    Map of the price of meat in cigarette’s pack 
 
Map of the price of sugar in cigarette’s pack    Map of the price of dollar in cigarette’s pack 
 
 
 
 